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ABSTRACT 
 
From its modest beginnings in a college student’s dorm room 25 years ago, Dell Computers has 
enjoyed unprecedented growth and success.  Throughout its history, the company has received 
countless accolades for its hyper-efficient production system.  Notwithstanding this distinctive 
competitive advantage, Dell Computers has experienced significant problems during the past few 
years.  Will the next few years be a time of rebirth for the once high-flying company, or is this the 
“beginning of the end” for Dell Computers?   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n 1984, Apple Computer and IBM dominated the personal computer market.  At that time, Dell 
Computers was a ground-floor operation headquartered in a dormitory room at the University of Texas 
Austin.  By 2009, Apple Computer accounted for less than five percent of PC sales.  (The company is 
rapidly transforming from a computer company to a digital music hardware and content provider, making more 
profit from its phenomenally successful iPod and iTunes than from computers.)  IBM‟s stature in the PC industry 
has likewise waned.  In 2005, the company abandoned the personal computer market altogether, selling its 
operations to a Chinese company.  Although Dell‟s future looks cloudy as of 2009, no one can argue that the 
company‟s climb to success in the computer industry has been nothing short of phenomenal.   
 
Michael Dell has always been an entrepreneurial individual.  When he was 12, he and a friend capitalized 
on their interest in stamp collecting by starting a stamp auction business.  The two partners had experience buying 
from local stamp auctioneers, who acted as the middlemen between seller and buyer.  Dell advertised his 12-page 
catalogue—which he produced himself on a clunky old typewriter—in a stamp collectors trade magazine.  To Dell‟s 
amazement, the business produced a $2,000 profit!  
 
Four years later, Michael expanded his business horizons, this time selling subscriptions to The Houston 
Post.  Initially cold calling the list of phone numbers provided by the paper, Michael soon realized that two groups 
seemed most interested in subscriptions - newlyweds and new arrivals to the Houston area.  Dell struck gold after he 
tracked down newly filed marriage certificates (which was public information in Texas) and finagled contact 
information from a number of local mortgage companies.  Dell recounts his newspaper success in his biography 
Direct from Dell: “One day, my history and economics teacher assigned us a project for which we had to file our tax 
return.  Based on what I had made selling newspaper subscriptions, my income was about $18,000 that year.  At first 
my teacher corrected me, assuming I had missed the decimal place.  When she realized I hadn‟t, she became even 
more dismayed.  To her surprise, I had made more money that year than she had.”1  At the ripe age of sixteen, 
Michael Dell‟s entrepreneurial proclivities were becoming increasingly obvious.    
 
In 1984, Michael Dell enrolled in the University of Texas Austin as a pre-med student.  Dell spent far more 
time hawking computer components out of his dorm room than he did studying.  Dell invested $1,000 to incorporate 
his business and he was on his way.  (Interestingly, Compaq Computers was founded two years prior, with initial 
seed capital exceeding $100 million!) Within months, Michael Dell was selling an astonishing $80,000 worth of 
computer equipment monthly.  By the end of his first year, Dell left the university—sans degree—as the president of 
I 
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a fledgling computer business.  From his experience selling stamps as a twelve year old, Michael Dell knew the 
benefits of cutting out the middlemen.  The benefits were so plain to see that Dell questioned why no one thought of 
selling computers direct before he did.  Fortunately for Dell, no one had. 
 
THE RISE OF DELL COMPUTERS (1984-2004)
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The production process at Dell is a “pull” system in which computers are made to order.  The production 
process begins when customers place orders via phone or internet.  Dell‟s flexible manufacturing process enables the 
company to produce and ship each customized product within four to eight hours after receiving an order.  The 
direct-to-consumer approach is an integral part of Dell‟s super-efficient production system.  The true benefit is that 
it enables Dell to gain tremendous efficiencies on the backward end of the supply chain.  Possibly no company has 
mastered just-in-time inventory better than Dell Computers.   
 
At Dell‟s state-of-the-art Morton L. Topfer Manufacturing Center (referred to as TMC), suppliers locate 
their operations in close proximity to the factory.  Dell instantaneously notifies suppliers of needed parts as orders 
come in from customers.  Suppliers have 90 minutes to ship the parts to the TMC.  Trucks entering the delivery area 
systematically park at one of the 110 delivery bays.  Forklift operators pluck only those pallets of parts needed for 
work currently in process.  Once the forklift crosses a white line on the floor of the loading dock, scanners register 
the parts and the inventory shifts from the supplier‟s books to Dell‟s.  The remaining parts on the truck remain the 
supplier‟s inventory until offloaded. 
 
Dell supports its JIT system through sophisticated forecasting techniques.  The company is so obsessive 
about measuring everything that industry insiders often note that the company has never met a metric that it did not 
like.  All that data gets poked and prodded by company analysts to develop highly accurate demand forecast models.  
(The company shares these forecasts with suppliers.)  Dell can accurately forecast 75% of the time.  While far from 
perfect, the success rate enables Dell to keep an already efficient inventory system humming along relatively 
smoothly.  In instances where forecasts prove inaccurate, Dell uses a supply-chain strategy called demand shaping 
to shift purchase patterns to more readily available components.  For instance, if the company is having difficulty 
getting 2.8 GHz Pentium 4 processors, it will offer a special on an upgrade.  Michael Dell elaborates on how the 
company uses demand shaping: “Information is our most important management tool… If the folks in our consumer 
business notice it‟s 10 am and they‟re not getting enough phone calls, they know they have to do something: run a 
promotion on the Web, starting at 10:15, or change their pricing or run more ads.  They can‟t wait until 30 days after 
the end of the quarter to figure it out.”3 
 
Efficiency is furthered by Dell‟s scrupulous focus on what happens within the walls of its production 
facilities.  Prior to 1997, Dell used a traditional mass assembly model to manufacture its computers.  Mass assembly 
techniques typically work best when there are few deviations in the production process.  Since Dell essentially 
builds each computer to meet the needs and demands of individual customers, the features of the final product vary 
widely.  Clearly, this is not an optimal setting for mass assembly.  Because of the difficulty in accommodating 
customized products within a traditional mass production system, Dell implemented a cellular manufacturing model 
in 1997. With the cellular manufacturing system, teams of employees work collaboratively to assemble computers 
according to customer specifications.  (In mass assembly settings workers perform narrow, repetitive tasks.)     
 
In 2000, Dell implemented a Six Sigma program, with a goal of eliminating $1.5 billion in expenses.  
Achieving the Six Sigma standard involves adhering to a rigorous, data-driven improvement process, which has as 
an ultimate goal the reduction of defects to no more than 3.4 defects per million observations.  (General Electric, one 
of the most avid adherents to Six Sigma, saved $10 billion during the first five years of its program.)  Some of the 
recommendations made under Dell‟s Six Sigma program are relatively simple, such as printing parts lists on plain as 
opposed to colored paper (net savings of $23,000 yearly).  Other changes return dramatic savings.  For instance, the 
program highlighted the inefficiencies of Dell‟s accounts payable system (the new system resulted in estimated 
annual savings of $2.4 million
4
).        
 
Dell hasn‟t always been so efficient.  In the early 1990s, the company began to question the long-term 
viability of the direct-sales model.  In the pursuit of expanded sales, Dell started offering PCs through the retail 
channel.  The move had its intended effect, goosing sales to $2.8 billion in 1994.  The only problem was that the 
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company faced the demon that plagues other computer manufacturers: excess inventory.  Dell‟s inventory swelled to 
nearly a month‟s worth of computer equipment.  The company suffered a staggering $36 million loss that year.  This 
experience reinforced the company‟s disdain for inventory.  Kevin Rollins (CEO of Dell from 2004-2007) likened 
inventory to perishable food products: “The longer you keep it the faster it deteriorates—you can literally see the 
stuff rot.  Because of the short product lifecycles, computer components depreciate anywhere from a half to a full 
point a week.  Cutting inventory is not just a nice thing to do.  It‟s a financial imperative.”5  Michael Dell echoed a 
similar sentiment:   
 
The typical case in our industry is the factory building 10,000 units a day, day in and day out.  First the machines 
stack up in the warehouse, and then they stack up in the channel.  And all of a sudden, the guy at the end of the 
chain hollers, “Whoa, hey, we’ve got too many of these.  Everybody stop!”  And the order to stop flows back 
through the chain until it reaches every component supplier.  It’s literally stop and start, because if you have a 90-
day lag between the point of demand and the point of supply, you’re going to have a lot of inefficiency in the 
process.  And the more inventory and time you have, the more variability, and the more problems.
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Dell‟s hyper-efficiency relies on more than a streamlined and efficient production system—the company‟s 
structure reflects the original entrepreneurial emphasis on speed and leanness.  Even as a multi-billion dollar 
corporation, Dell maintains a flat organizational structure that promotes decentralized decision-making.  A 2004 
article in Strategy & Business describes the company‟s structure as such:  
 
Dell is a prototypical flat organization.  From the factory floor to corporate communications, decisions are made 
quickly and without the burden of superfluous hierarchy.  If a supervisor on the factory floor sees a way to reduce 
component inventories, he simply does it without going up the chain of command for approval.  Dell’s internal 
communications have stayed efficient, so that decisions that don’t require the attention of senior management get 
made without them.
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Beyond being able to turn on a dime to meet market demand shifts, Dell‟s production model has 
tremendous implications for cash flow.  When a customer places an order with Dell, the company instantaneously 
receives cash (typically via credit card payment).  In turn, Dell‟s suppliers do not receive payment for 30-36 days.  
That‟s like getting a zero percent interest rate loan from suppliers! In contrast, computer manufacturers such as H-P 
using traditional distribution channels have to wait for retailers and distributors to pay their bills.  During the heyday 
of the direct-to-consumer model, Dell Computers was a cash-generating machine. 
 
THE TIDE BEGINS TO TURN:  THE KEVIN ROLLINS ERA (2004-2007) 
 
In 2004 when Michael Dell stepped down as CEO (he retained the position of Chairman of the Board), Dell 
Computers was the dominant player in the computer industry.  No other company could rival the breathtaking 
efficiency of Dell‟s production system.  The company‟s closet rival H-P was still struggling to find its footing after 
the mega-merger between HP and Compaq.  (At that time, Dell sold more PCs than the combined sales of the next 
four largest computers sellers.)  Michael Dell‟s replacement—Kevin Rollins—could not have inherited a more 
enviable situation.  Nevertheless, Rollins‟ tenure as CEO of Dell would last a mere three years, and the company he 
would leave behind would be vastly different from the one he inherited.  
 
Kevin Rollins joined Dell in 1996, first as Senior VP for Corporate Strategy, and then ultimately becoming 
President of North American Operations and COO.  Rollins‟ credentials were impeccable.  Prior to joining Dell, he 
was a partner at Bain & Company (a prestigious management consulting firm), where he specialized in strategic 
management for high-tech firms.  In fact, it was because of his expertise that Dell Computers retained the services of 
Bain & Company in 1993 to help the company develop strategies for improving its direct-to-consumer approach.  It 
is widely acknowledged within the company that Rollins was the one who brought the metric-centric company to a 
whole new level of rigorous measurement.  In so doing, his recommendations helped catapult Dell Computers to the 
top of the computer industry.  Thus, it was a no brainer for Michael Dell to bring Rollins onboard as a full-time 
employee of Dell in 1996.  
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After assuming the CEO position, Rollins quickly determined that for all the company‟s success, something 
just wasn‟t right.  While all financial indicators indicated that the company was performing admirably well, Rollins 
became concerned that Dell was losing its soul.  As he explained in a 2004 interview: “I realized that we had created 
a culture of stock price, a culture of financial performance, and a culture of „what‟s in it for me?‟  throughout the 
employee base.  There had to be something more in this institution that we loved and enjoyed more than just making 
money or just having a stock price that went up.”8  An article in the Austin Statesmen noted that the once dynamic, 
entrepreneurial culture was beginning to ossify and the motivation of the workforce waning:    
 
In interviews with more than two dozen current and recently departed employees, two common themes 
emerge: 
 
1. Many who joined the company in the go-go days of the 1990s said that Dell has become top-heavy and 
bureaucratic, not the exciting, hard-charging place it was. It has cracked the top 25 on the Fortune 500 list, 
and it's twice the size it was in 2000. But with that, some employees said, has come a management style 
that's too constraining. 
2. Others lamented that there's little financial incentive to stay. Nine out of 10 Dell stock options — once the 
key to enormous wealth — would cost more to exercise than the shares are worth. For many workers, the 
last in-the-money options, issued not long after the Sept. 11 attacks, recently became worthless.
9
 
 
Rollins characterized the state of Dell as in transition, from adolescence to maturity: “I think we've moved 
from teen-aged to adulthood right now, early adulthood.  We just don't want to get to old age. We want to stay at 
maturity and keep going.”10  To Rollins, the most serious threat to the company‟s future was the company itself.  
Dell Computers needed to reconsider its core values if it was to maintain its leadership role in the computer industry.  
The company Kevin Rollins inherited had only one core value—to win.  Dell‟s culture emphasized the fanatical 
pursuit of performance improvement, obsessive emphasis on cost reduction, and an unrelenting quest for speed, the 
intent of all was to dominate the marketplace.     
 
Feedback from the company‟s employee survey process (known as the Tell Dell surveys) suggested that 
employees desired more opportunities for career development as well as a better work-life balance.  The surveys 
also indicated that the company was rewarding too many managers who made their numbers, but lacked 
communications skills or the appreciation for collaborative managerial practices.  Overall, the company had 
developed a sink-or-swim philosophy.  The negative aspects of the culture identified by the Tell Dell Surveys were 
confirmed in a cultural audit performed by a consulting firm.   
 
Restoring balance to the company meant that the core values of Dell had to emphasize more than winning.  
In response to this feedback, Rollins and Dell developed a new statement of company values named The Soul of Dell 
(Table 1).  The Soul of Dell (summarized in the box below) emphasized five primary priorities: (a) providing a 
superior customer experience, (b) emphasizing employee teamwork and development, (c) maintaining direct and 
open communications with employees, (d) acting as a responsible corporate citizen, and (e) having a passion for 
winning.    
 
The loss of soul—while important—may have only been the tip of the iceberg.  By 2006, the company was 
beginning to stumble.  In that year, H-P overtook Dell as the world‟s largest PC producer (as of August 2009 H-P 
had a 19.8% market share compared to 13.7% for Dell) and Dell‟s growth slipped below the industry growth rate for 
the first time in the company‟s history.  The swift change in Dell‟s fortunes was the result of three main factors: (a) 
customer service problems resulting from outsourcing customer support; (b) product quality problems related to 
defective laptop batteries; and (c) the company‟s faulty response to declining desktop sales.   
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Table 1:  Statement of Company Values 
 
The Soul Of Dell 
 
Many people are familiar with Dell's customer-focused direct business model, and the company's success in creating leading 
value for customers and investors. Less well known is the unique environment forged by Michael Dell and the people of Dell 
since the company's founding in 1984. 
 
We characterize that environment in a statement of corporate philosophy called the "Soul of Dell." It defines the kind of 
company we are and aspire to become, serves as a guide for our actions around the world, and ultimately forms the basis of our 
"winning culture." 
 
Below are the core elements of the Soul of Dell: 
 
Customers: We believe in creating loyal customers by providing a superior experience at a great value. We are committed to 
direct relationships, providing the best products and services based on standards-based technology, and outperforming the 
competition with value and a superior customer experience. 
The Dell Team: We believe our continued success lies in teamwork and the opportunity each team member has to learn, 
develop and grow. We are committed to being a meritocracy, and to developing, retaining and attracting the best people, 
reflective of our worldwide marketplace. 
 
Direct Relationships: We believe in being direct in all we do. We are committed to behaving ethically; responding to customer 
needs in a timely and reasonable manner; fostering open communications and building effective relationships with customers, 
partners, suppliers and each other; and operating without inefficient hierarchy and bureaucracy. 
 
Global Citizenship: We believe in participating responsibly in the global marketplace. We are committed to understanding and 
respecting the laws, values and cultures wherever we do business; profitably growing in all markets; promoting a healthy 
business climate globally; and contributing positively in every community we call home, both personally and organizationally. 
 
Winning: We have a passion for winning in everything we do. We are committed to operational excellence, superior customer 
experience, leading in the global markets we serve, being known as a great company and great place to work, and providing 
superior shareholder value over time. 
Source: http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/about_dell/values/supp_citizen/soul?c=us&l=en&s=corp#soul 
 
 
In part, Dell‟s decline was the result of some significant customer service setbacks.  During the tech-bust in 
2001, Dell like all computer companies scrambled to find ways to reduce costs.  The company saw an opportunity to 
save significant money by outsourcing its customer service to India. (In a related decision, the company also 
shortened its warrantees from three years to three months.)  At the time, few could question this decision because 
India was fast becoming a Mecca for outsourcing telemarketing.  However, from the beginning, outsourcing created 
problems for the company.  A Forbes article describes the problems created by outsourcing technical and customer 
support to India: “Dell was among the earliest computer companies to route customer service and technical support 
calls to India. Dell set up its first center in Bangalore in 2001… Language and cultural rifts between disgruntled 
U.S. customers and Dell's bright but unseasoned Indian support staff fueled the flames. U.S. customers say they got 
frustrated when Dell employees fielding calls seemed unwilling to depart from a script.”11  The company quickly 
realized a backlash from its outsourced support functions, particularly from commercial customers but also amongst 
its consumer market.  At a time when computers were rapidly becoming commodity products, customers viewed 
after-sales support as a key determinant in how they evaluated computers.  While the intent of outsourcing was to 
reduce the company‟s cost structure—thereby enabling it to lower its prices to consumers—the result was a 
significant public relations fiasco.  Outsourcing created tremendous reverberations amongst existing and potential 
customers. Rollins ultimately conceded that this short-term cost saving came at the expense of long-term success.  
As he stated in a 2006 interview: "We have to change our perspective and we have to do things that drive long-term 
success, not short-term success.  I think that's a bit of a change in perspective, and it's just maturing of the 
management."
12
  Because of the substantial loss of goodwill, Dell had to plow $100 million dollars into new hiring 
and training to enhance sales and support.  
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In addition to the company‟s customer service problems, Dell‟s image was further tarnished by quality 
problems and poor product design.  In 2006, the company ordered a massive recall of 4.1 million laptop batteries 
after a video circulating on the internet showed a Dell laptop burst into flames during a conference in Japan.  Stories 
of laptop combustions spread (like wildfire) across the internet.  In one such incidence, a house in Biddeford Maine 
burned to the ground.  The State Fire Marshall, who attributed the fire to a Dell Inspirion laptop, stated the 
following: “That was the only thing we had in terms of a heat source. The couch was totally burned out, and the 
laptop was still sitting on what remained of the sofa.”13  While the cause of the laptop fires was eventually attributed 
to the lithium-ion battery produced by Sony (and in fact affected other laptop manufacturers such as Apple and H-
P), Dell became a scapegoat in the blogosphere.   
 
Possibly the most significant cause of Dell‟s performance slippage was the company‟s lackluster response 
to the shift from desktop to laptop computers.  Simply put, Dell was flat-footed in recognizing that customers were 
abandoning desktops for laptops in droves.  Within a mere three year period, demand for desktops evaporated 
precipitously.  This was particularly problematic for Dell as its ultra-efficient factories were set up for desktop as 
opposed to laptop production.  In essence, the company found itself in a position of being a highly efficient producer 
of products customers no longer sought.  In comparison, competitors such as H-P were shifting the production of 
their laptops to lower cost Asian contract manufacturers.  A Wall Street Journal article said the following of Dell‟s 
loss of its cost advantage: “… Dell has lost its low-cost edge as its rivals shifted to using Asian factories-for-hire to 
build their wares.  Today, many of Dell‟s own factories, such as the one in North Carolina that‟s only about three 
years old, can no longer compete on cost.”14  Further compounding problems with Dell‟s product line-up was a 
general disregard for designing products with appeal to the consumer market.  As one industry analyst put it: “Dell 
also failed to capture the imagination of consumers with its products, which were viewed as dull at best and ugly at 
worst.  Rollins was excellent at supply chain and logistics but did not seem to understand the importance of 
industrial design.”15   
 
While Michael Dell and Kevin Rollins had a history of working collaboratively—and thus the blame for 
Dell‟s decline should have been shared equally between the two—there was a growing perception on Wall Street 
that Kevin Rollins was responsible for the company‟s sub-par performance.  As one Wall Street analyst put it: 
“Coincidence or otherwise, Kevin's visibility rose about the time the wheels starting coming off.  At the end of the 
day, employees and investors can't see the two men sitting at two desks with an open wall, collaborating with each 
other. All they see is two eras of Dell marked with two different names at the helm.”16 
 
POSTSCRIPT:  THE RETURN OF MICHAEL DELL 
 
On January 31, 2007, Kevin Rollins‟ era as CEO came to an unceremonious end as Michael Dell stepped 
back into the CEO role. Although Dell had maintained confidence in Rollins, the mounting financial performance 
slump, coupled with allegations of accounting improprieties finally got the better of Rollins.  One Wall Street 
analyst noted, “It‟s surprising. Rollins had the confidence of (Michael) Dell, but when you look at the numbers you 
can see why Dell has retaken the helm.  They have been suffering from a corporate market slump, and the usual bag 
of tricks—leveraging the supply chain and their economies of scale—haven‟t worked.”17  
 
Dell Computers announced a dramatic about-face in 2008.  First, the company is actively trying to unload 
its factories and is working with contract manufactures to manufacture its products.  (The company owns factories in 
Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, Ireland, India, China, Brazil, Malaysia, and Poland.) Dell‟s factories are 
still the most efficient in the world, but they are set up for manufacturing desktop computers. With laptops the 
company uses a cumbersome process in which laptop are partially manufactured by contract manufacturers and then 
shipped to Dell factories for final manufacture.  This process, referred to as the “two touch” system by Dell, is 
significantly less efficient (and more costly) than competitors such as H-P and Apple who farm out the entire laptop 
production process.  The second change of direction announced by the company in 2008 was that it was going to 
once again sell its computers in the retail channel (e.g., with Walmart and Best Buy).  Whereas customers were 
willing to purchase desktop systems without seeing, feeling, and touching them, laptops were different.  Consumers 
were far more hesitant to purchase these systems without first seeing them.  While the company‟s original foray into 
retail sales ended under inauspicious circumstances, by 2008 Dell had little leeway in the decision to utilize 
traditional retail channels.    
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In a press release announcing his return to the helm of the company he founded, Michael Dell said the 
following: “Dell has tremendous opportunities ahead of it, I am enthusiastic about Dell 2.0, which includes our plan 
to provide the best customer experience, build a strong global services business and ensure our products deliver the 
best long-term customer value.”  What exactly will Dell 2.0 look like?  Will it succeed?  Or is Dell Computers 
another story of a company that leveraged their capabilities to shoot to the top of their industry, only to fade as 
quickly because it became too enamored of itself to continue to grow and evolve? The story continues to unfold.   
 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
 
1. Discuss the primary benefits Dell Computer derived from its just-in-time inventory system. 
2. Perform a Porter‟s Five Forces analysis for Dell Computers.  Which forces are of primary importance to 
Dell? 
3. Dell Computers is widely admired for its competitive edge associated with efficiency.  Yet, in spite of this 
strength, the company has experienced a precipitous decline in its competitive position.  What specific 
factors account for this decline?   
4. Kevin Rollins identified the myopic focus on winning as a primary problem for Dell Computers.  In 
hindsight, did he make a mistake in making the “Soul of Dell” a strategic priority during his time as CEO?  
5. Kevin Rollins was widely blamed for the diminishment of Dell‟s competitive position.  Discuss whether 
this assignment of blame was appropriate or not.   Should Michael Dell also receive commensurate blame?  
6. Evaluate the company‟s two recent decisions to (a) sell its production facilities and outsource production 
and (b) distribute through traditional retail channels.  Do these decisions make sense for the company?      
7. The case concludes with the following questions: What exactly will Dell 2.0 look like?  Will it succeed?  
Or is Dell Computers another story of a company that leveraged their capabilities to shoot to the top of their 
industry, only to fade as quickly because it became too enamored of itself to continue to grow and evolve?  
Discuss each of these questions. 
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